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Štefica Fiolić*

DE-TRADITIONALIZATION, GENDER AND NEW FORMS OF IDEOLOGY IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A CASE STUDY FROM NORTHERN CROATIA

Contrary to the widely held notion that in the context of reactionary, ethno-nationalist ideology since the 1980s patriarchal gender relations were either revitalized from old traditions or merely invented, this presentation suggests a change of perspective. Based on Detlev Claussen's concept of *Alltagsreligion* (everyday religion), which as modern ideology does not lay a claim to truth but rather offers a set of flexible and fragmented certainties and prejudices, this paper discusses how ethnic notions of gender allow women and men to deal with individual and collective crises albeit in an ideological – yet specifically modern – manner. The theoretical discussion will be linked to ethnographic observations made during field work in northern Croatia in 2008 and to biographical-narrative interviews. From the insights gained, the paper will also examine how everyday religious interpretations have become part of contemporary scientific opinion.

Key words: Ethno-nationalism (in Croatian Society), gender, (post) socialist societies, critique of ideology (Ideologiekritik), biographical research

1. THE BALKANIZATION OF GENDER-RELATIONS (?)

The end of the bipolar world order and the simultaneous collapse of the state at the beginning of the 1990s put Yugoslavia on the map of scholarly attention. Apart from security and strategic issues for the international community it was mainly the forms of violence that made closer observation necessary. Here the relation between gender and ethnicity was a central focus of academic debate. Gender was mainly addressed in the context of the mass rapes in Bosnia that were part of ethnic cleansings.

With the demise of Yugoslavia, women and men that had been acknowledged as Yugoslavs and – simultaneously – as members of regional nationalities, and who more often than not saw themselves according to these dual links before the wars, became the subjects and victims of ethno-political and nationalist claims and – shortly after that – warfare. Ethnic minorities were persecuted and driven from the newly independent states which constituted themselves according to ethnic divisions. The strategies of the warring parties were not gender neutral – just like the populist nationalist rhetoric in pre-war Yugoslavia.

* Faculty of Social Sciences at Goethe University in Frankfurt; fiolic@soz.uni-frankfurt.de

The symbolic meaning of female bodies, denoting the reproduction as well as the vulnerability of the national body, and the notions of emasculation and resurrection of damaged masculinity tied up with it have been discussed widely (see Jalušić 2004: 40–68, 171–205; Yuval-Davis 2001; Žarkov 1997; Cockburn 2000; Seifert 2004: 171–205; Hromadžić 2004: 112–131; Mostov 2000; 89–110).

These scholarly engagements with gender in former Yugoslavia focus on discursive and symbolic aspects that were heavily and understandably influenced by the atrocities that happened during the wars and the construction of the ethno-national discourse.

This focus, though, runs the risk of obscuring another – equally important – question: that of modernity and modernization in socialist societies. The demise of real existing socialism and the end of the cold war make it necessary to reflect on the sociological concepts used for the analysis of modern societies and on their ability to understand socialist societies.

Yet in most writings on gender in (post-) Yugoslav societies, modernity and social transformations during socialism are obscured by recourse to concepts such as traditionality and retraditionalization which are used to describe the reactionary forms of gender relations and discourses undoubtedly prevalent in these societies (see Brunnbauer 2002: 161; Šikić-Mičanović 2007: 459–476; Ramet 1999; Kaser, Halpern 1994: 4)[1]. Notions of archaic social norms, uncivilized ethnic groups, violence and barbarity were revived during the wars in Yugoslavia. Age-old ethnic rivalries, cultures of war and violence and a Balkan mentality prone to violence were among the images used to come to terms with the shocking atrocities during the 1990s[2].

The violence directed at women seemed to make this view of the Balkans plausible. Gender relations were seen as essentially violent and patriarchal social forms were apparently revitalized.

> These deep seated prejudices contributed to the building and continuation of the (dangerous) stereotype of "Balkanization" together with a belief that the old European nations are far above such "barbaric" practices, which represent something typical for the "other" regions. This reinforces a European Mythology of higher civilized space and historic development. Furthermore the typical western stereotype of the "masculinized" and especially sexist Balkans is to be viewed with caution. The view of the predominately violent Balkans has been reinforced even by some feminists attributed to the violent tradition of the traditional Balkan family patterns and the exploitation of women, the long years of socialist emancipation notwithstanding (Jalušić 2004: 62).

The work of Marina Blagojević is a case in point. While she acknowledges at least a rhetoric of emancipation under communist rule and concedes that female employment was

[1] It can be argued that the factual rise of reactionary notions of gender in post Yugoslav societies and the atrocious acts of violence during the wars have helped perpetuate stereotypical images of the Balkans. As Maria Todorova has shown, the constitution of the Balkans as Europe's Other reveals more about the underlying notions of the respective authors and discourses than about the designated borders and social conditions in the countries and regions in South-Eastern Europe: "In the academic world the concept has been used by exponents of different and often contradictory political views: Balkanization has been used as a synonym for multiculturalism, it is the name for excessive specialization, a metaphor for post-modernity and post-communism" (Todorova 1999: 60) [translated by the author].

[2] The assumption of long-standing traditions of violence expressing themselves in hatred and retaliation could not only be found in the media but also in scholarly works. See, e.g. Kaplan 1994.

the norm, she simultaneously views the gender roles in pre-war Serbia as traditional, rigid and relatively closed. Notions of masculinity and femininity had remained largely unchanged despite partial modernization. According to Blagojević, the survival of traditions and their revitalization in the course of ethno-nationalist movements are the roots of the reactionary gender formations prevalent in post-Yugoslav societies today (Blagojević 2004: 78–82). Despite her own intentions she thus falls in line with the Balkan stereotypes criticized by Jalušić. Trying to explain the effects the social transformations after 1990 had on gender relations with recourse to concepts of tradition and re-traditionalization has to fall short as long as one does not acknowledge "the long years of socialist emancipation" – contradictory as they may be. Trying to explain what is new about the new post-socialist societies becomes nearly impossible when one tries to trace it to traditions and their revitalization as it ignores the experiences during socialist rule.

These problems are in many ways similar to those one faces when trying to explain ethno-nationalism. After 1989 the ethnicization of the social was one way of reacting to the modes of power and authority in real socialist societies. The perception of new social tendencies in seemingly old terms is, as Detlev Claussen points out, part of the problem of ethno-nationalism (Claussen 2000: 16–42).

> Modern processes of ethnicization are obviously processes of collective self-reflection between politics and society, self- reflections on "identity", "culture", "tradition" etc. It is a self-reflection on concepts that remain undetermined as regards their content, which have no concrete content, denote no concrete idea of society anymore. Collective self-reflection apparently has the conformist function of a "discourse of avoidance", a discourse, that is, that owes its attractiveness not to its manifest content but rather to that which it does not contain – speaking about a concrete, existing society. Its attractiveness for post-socialist societies lay and lies in its ability to allow the survival of the dominant, specifically real-socialist type of authoritarian character that is marked by an authoritarian devotion to the collective interests and the simultaneous, secret and ruthless pursuit of individual, mostly material interests. This means that the specificity of modern ethno--nationalism lies in the separation of ideological contents on the one hand and its social function (the factual social actions legitimized by them) on the other hand (Weber 2010: 71) [translated by the author].

It could be argued that the ethno-nationalism in Yugoslavia and the ethnicization of gender relations connected with it helped obscure the underlying social relations for those living in the society just as the concentration on ethno-nationalist discourse and its recourse to traditions in academic analyses obscured the social and historical background.

2. RE-THINKING RE-TRADITIONALIZATION

At first sight it might seem plausible to interpret the apparent backlash as a continuation or revitalization of traditional gender relations. Women were increasingly driven from the Croatian labor market, the Catholic church gained socio-economic influence and – together with the newly elected governments of the post-socialist era – propagated reactionary family and

gender models, and abortion was prohibited (see Kunovich, Deitelbaum 2004: 1089–1107; Gal, Kligman 2000; Huseby 2009: 102–120; Rueschemeyer1994).

At the same time the notion of re-traditionalization remains problematic when trying to understand the repercussions social change had on gender relations and images. The concentration on tradition runs danger of being a-historical, as long as it does not take into account Yugoslavia's transformation from a widely agrarian to an – at least partially – industrialized economy and the encompassing changes in living and working conditions, in family relations and modes of production. The implementation of state controlled modernization after the Second World War has had effects far beyond the socialist period, fundamentally changing Yugoslav society and its traditions[3].

The interpretations of the emancipatory effects of the judicial, economic and institutional changes that took place after the foundation of Yugoslavia in 1948 are multifaceted. On the one hand the rift between urban and rural areas and between different regions in Yugoslavia, which allowed for traditions to survive, is being pointed out. On the other hand women are seen as having had access only to the social sphere while being widely excluded from participation in politics and the economy (see Jalušić 2004, Wiesinger 2008)[4]. Denich observes a growing differentiation of female gender roles in the 1970s while at the same time pointing out the prevalence of traditional gender roles. The ideal of women being workers and mothers at the same time was substituted by a stronger emphasis on the family (see Denich 1977: 154). In the context of an accelerating economic crisis which became apparent in the early 1980s, it could be argued that being pushed out of the labor market left women no other choice than to fall back on their roles as mothers and homemakers. This development was then legitimized by stressing family values and unambiguous gender roles in the context of rising ethno-nationalism (see Blagojević 2004: 70–75).

The concentration on ethno-nationalism and the notion of traditionality when dealing with gender in former Yugoslavia runs the risk of elongating these discourses instead of understanding them as the outcome of contradictory historical developments, without which the changing gender relations in the post-war societies remain invisible. This means, that theoretical assumptions about changes of gender-relations in former Yugoslavia since the 1990s are paradoxically marked by a historical considerations as well as additional ethnicization in the face of violent conflicts during ethno nationalism. Similar to assumptions about a pretended "return of the national", assumptions about the re-traditionalization of gender relations imply a "return of traditions and patriarchy". Apart from the fact that these assumptions seem to rely on Eurocentric ideas of catch-up development and a European ideal of modernity, they tend to essentialize social changes and their impact on gender-relations during the socialist era[5]. The problem one

[3] Vera Stein Erlich has shown that traditional ways of life had already changed considerably in the 1930s and that patriarchal families were being eroded by the advance of a money-based economy (see Erlich 1971).

[4] In how far this is any different from gender relations in Western European societies like Germany, where women needed their husbands' permission to work until 1977 and rape inside the marriage was not considered a criminal offence until 1997 escapes me.

[5] Stefan Plaggenborg points to a similar problem with regard to the Soviet Union. Applying normative concepts of modernity has the effect of viewing socialist states as dead in a dual sense: As failed systems that did not stand the test of modern times and as unable to provide an ideal for coping with current problems and crises (see Plaggenborg 2006: 10).

can assert is similar to the one dealing with nationalism, which Michael Werz concisely pointed out:

> Even though everybody is talking about the return of the national and the protagonist itself current ethno nationalist movement perceive themselves and their opponents in the categories of the 19th centuries it is impossible to take of these categories. The connection seems to be a process of continual regression; the universal, progressive properties of early national movements did not last long. Today ethnic categories are dressed up as nationalistic and are used falsely as explanations for social and political conflicts (Werz 2000: 6).

The drastic changes after 1990 are grounded in experiences made in a socialist society; these are not automatically neutralized by the massive and violent transitions but rather continue to exert an influence on the present. Until now we have little knowledge how the social transformations in socialist and post-socialist Yugoslavia were dealt with on an individual or collective level. "We cannot know how social reality was altered after the system changed, if we do not know what it was like beforehand" (Rosenthal 2000: 114).

If this is not accomplished, social conditions and contradictions in contemporary post-Yugoslav societies are overlooked and the focus remains either on an ethno-nationalist discourse – which is thereby taken as an adequate self-interpretation of these societies – or it shifts toward normative notions of democracy and equality which are modeled after western societies. Either approach makes a closer understanding of social change in South-Eastern Europe hard to come by.

3. DOING EVERYDAY RELIGION: A CASE STUDY FROM NORTHERN CROATIA

3.1. ON THE BIOGRAPHICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EVERYDAY RELIGION

I would like to contrast this tendency with the critical concept of everyday religion (Alltagsreligion), developed by Detlev Claussen. The concept allows for a change of perspective when looking at the constitution of collective forms of subjectivity and the effect these ideological categories have on gender in the context of socialist modernization, ethno-nationalist nation building and a post war society.

The concept of everyday religion was first developed in the context of the (ethnic) collapse of the socialist states in Europe and the (existential) crisis felt by many in these countries, which found expression in questions like "Who are we? Where do we come from? Whose fault is it?" These questions were answered more often than not in ethnic terms: "We have always been here! We come from a long line of ancestors! It's their fault!" (Claussen 1994: 63). Everyday religion signifies an ideological change which is characterised amongst other things by the occurrence of concepts pertaining to archaic communities which are used to explain social fissures in modern societies and constitute new social realities.

The concept allows for approaching the novelty of these changed perceptions. Everyday religion signifies a contemporary, hyper-modern average consciousness; a blend

of resentment, prejudices, opinions, which form a flexible set of certainties that allow for orientation in everyday life and are immune to criticism. In situations of social change when existential questions arise, everyday religious practices become especially important. The production of meaning is carried out by a homogenisation of consciousness and the subjective notion of being part of an elite (having knowledge only a few possess and being bold enough to express it) while simultaneously representing the majority (expressing what everybody thinks and falling in line with common sense). In its combination of opinion, meaning and common sense everyday religion is immune to criticism. These ideological reactions absorb remainders of historical experience – secularization and nation-building, real existing socialism and decolonisation – and "they surprisingly combine to form new alloys of ignorance" (ibidem)[6].

I would like to discuss this change of perspective with recourse to a biographical narrative interview I conducted in Croatia in 2008. In order not to read the subjective experience as a simple reflection of exterior circumstances I relied on the method of conversation analysis (Schütze 1977:159–274). Schütze's approach concentrates on the socially mediated forms of narration, looking closely at the immanent principles of meaning that structure biographical narratives. Schütze looks at cognitive figures and process structures of biographies in order to analyze different ways of coping with biographical challenges. This approach is helpful in so far as it takes individual, subjective narratives as a basis for theoretical work rather than using the interviews as mere examples that are abstractly confronted with e.g. social structural data.

According to Bettina Dausien the biographical constitution of gender is viewed as a contradictory social and individual process of construction that cannot be reduced to typically "male" or "female" biographies. At best one might find characteristics for biographies of men and women in specific historical social situations. To characterise this Dausien speaks of gender linkage (Geschlechtsgebundenheit), meaning that notions of gender cannot be isolated from their social and biographical context (Dausien 1995: 6).

> This means that the gender linkage (Geschlechtsgebundenheit) of biographical constructions cannot be reduced to the impact of social constructions of masculinity and femininity, but is rather based on complex, socio-spatially and historically differentiated structural conditions of individual and collective practices. The concrete surroundings to act are therefore always gender surroundings (Dausien 1995: 583).

[6] The concept of everyday religion is an attempt to explain the new quality of ideology at the end of the short 20th century. It draws mainly on Adorno's and Horkheimer's critical theory and its attempt to understand the changes in ideology in (capitalist) mass societies. Their notion that any claim to truth in modern ideologies had been substituted for a flexible yet impervious set of opinions is one of Claussen's starting points. When dealing with phenomena like nationalism and ethnicity his work draws on concepts introduced by Anderson (imagined communities) and Hobsbawm (invention of tradition). In contrast to these, everyday religion focuses more on the mediation of social and cultural practices with (collective) subjectivity. Claussen's perspective is not so much based on social functionality but rather on the dialectics of social practice and the production of meaning.

3.2. FORCED IDENTIFICATIONS AND NEW MODES OF ACTION – GENDER, ETHNICITY AND RELIGION AS COPING STRATEGIES

The interviewee, Mrs. Popić, spent most of her life in Croatia where she was born and used to work as a teacher. She was married to a man from Bosnia-Herzegovina and they had two children together. In the aftermath of the war, her husband started to identify with Croatian nationalism and divorced her. The ethno-nationalism of the 1990s and the nationalism of her husband forced her to see herself as a Serb. Until the rise of ethno-nationalism her ethnicity as a Serb held no meaning to her or her family. She and her husband identified themselves as Yugoslavs during socialist times, where education, social and geographical mobility and their profession were the main focuses of identification. Their children were not baptised until the mid-1990s. With the rise of ethno-nationalism, she agreed to her children being baptized as Roman Catholics in order to protect them from discrimination and social isolation. After her divorce she started to volunteer in an Orthodox church and helped older refugees who were the victims of institutionalized discrimination upon their return to Croatia.

In Mrs.' Popić's interview the divorce from her husband, whom she introduces via his Croatian-Herzegovinian nationality, is one of the central motifs of the entire presentation of the narrative. In retrospect, she reinterprets her separation from her husband mostly along ethnic lines. This ethnic reinterpretation of events and their effects on her own biography represent a form of secondary biographical work (Bukow 1999: 92–104), which enable her to deal with changes that set into motion a trajectory process of suffering[7]. This is exacerbated by the ethnic mobilisation in Croatia, the fear of social isolation and separation from her Croatian children and juridical repercussions.

It becomes clear that in this period, which she evaluates as a "catastrophe", a "way of the cross", she experienced several "shocks". The modes in which she made sense of her world before the 1990s were severely shaken and her potential to act was limited. With the end of her marriage she loses one of her fundamental social frames, which amplifies her fear of social exclusion in the face of the economic and political crisis and the increasing ethno- nationalism. Although her action schemes in this phase were shaped by an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty due to the increasing ethno-nationalism, the trajectory process of suffering that structures her whole narrative was triggered by the fact that her husband himself started identifying as a nationalist. As much as she distances herself from his self-categorization according to nationalistic attributes, her trajectory has led her to identify with her own ethnic community while at the same time distancing herself from extreme forms of nationalism: "I am not one of these nationalists; I love my people most in the world. But I respect the others". Through this contradictory argumentation she regains her capability to act. She is able to distance herself from Croatian nationalism while simultaneously identifying with her own ethnic group. The affinity in the modes of identification allows her to cope with the new realities in Croatia.

[7] "Trajectory processes of suffering convey a sense of fate in the life of the trajectory incumbents; they force them to see themselves as controlled by strange outer forces that cannot be influenced easily or at all. They reshape the present life situation, reverse expectations of the future, and mobilize reinterpretations of the life course. Personal fate, therefore, is a biographical phenomenon in the strict sense" (Riemann, Schütze 1991: 338).

Yet these new found ethnic associations are neither entirely new nor are they a recourse to traditions. Rather they are a way of negotiating new social realities and her own trajectory of suffering on the one hand and modes of orientation and thought that have their roots in her Yugoslav experience on the other. This can be seen in the way she classifies people around her. Those that were able to hold on to the multi-ethnic ideals of Yugoslavia are labelled as "normal" whereas those that gave in to nationalism are considered abnormal. In this context, individuals – as for instance a colleague – became bearers of hope, who resisted nationalism even though under collective pressure.

> Well, there were some colleagues that didn't talk at all with us, but there were some normal people among them... mhm... I had one colleague, a professor of Croatian who was wonderful... yes... then my director, he is a director of the school, he was wonderful. They have always been good people... yes... good, good...

While the general nationalism in Croatia and most of all her husband's new-found identifications forced Mrs. Popić into being Serbian and thus adapting to the general nationalist climate (albeit in opposition to the Croatian majority) she is able to simultaneously integrate old certainties. This becomes evident in her position towards religion as well.

In the late 1990s Mrs. Popić started to volunteer in a Serbian Orthodox church. Her turn towards religion and her volunteer work in church can be seen as a reaction to the loss of everyday certainties. Her voluntary work coincides with her losing her role as wife, her repositioning as a working woman and mother (she is a teacher and has two children) and her solidarity with elderly non-Croatian citizens who faced discrimination and were then returning to Croatia. When asked how she managed with the changes she explains her turn to religion as follows:

> Thanks to faith... mhm... otherwise I would have gone to a psychiatrist... yes... thank God that I didn't... yes... Thanks to the church and the pilgrimage and so... yes... I owe this only to it, because I wouldn't be able to stand all that but thanks to God and somehow. But maybe it had to happen to me in my life, so that I came to faith. No one knows.

Using religious interpretations she translates the political demand for ethnic equality which has its roots in Yugoslav multi-nationalism into a universalist notion of multi-religious and equal participation. To her, morality and religion are means to overcome ethnic differences which she simultaneously emphasizes.

> I would like it if he [her son] were more religious, because I think that every religious person if he is a real believer... mhm... whether is a good person... mhm... whether it is Islam, since in the Koran nothing is written about... mhm... we as Christians claim they're terrorists. But what have we as Christians done in the past? Crusades, the First and the Second World War but I think to be honest... yes... I read the Koran, not all of it but to get an overview, to be informed. Nowhere is it written that terrorism is a commandment, that's not true. I knew an old lady; she was a refugee from P-town in Bosnia. She was by far the best person I ever met. I never met such a good Christian. Insofar there are blatant stupidities to be aware of... mhm... and why above all should we mark others with such a stigma, that generations believe that it made a huge difference?

Thus she creates a new framework which helps her to negotiate her place in society. Her work in church as well as the fact that after her divorce she defines herself mostly through her work and her social status (and not her gender) allows her to enter a process of normalization. Through this she re-acquires her ability to act and negotiate everyday life (part of which is her "Yugoslav" self-image as a working woman). She enters new social networks, also with people who were afflicted by the wars much more than she was. The volunteer work in church and her new faith allow her to integrate her divorce and the personal crises connected to it into a larger communal framework.

This production of meaning is highly practical, though. Mrs. Popić's new-found faith and her self-ethnicization go hand in hand with helping other women in church, being acknowledged for her good education and engaging in a community. It is this combination of "ideological" and practical aspects that enable her to deal with her divorce and her personal crises biographically. The position she lost through her divorce and the ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia is re-acquired through ethnic (self-) invention and community work.

Her self-ethnicization can be seen as a reaction to her husband's Herzegovinian nationalism which she presents as a prototype for the new Croatian nationalism. Her husband's transformation takes place simultaneously to the development of ethno-nationalism in Croatia. His reinvention as an ethnic Croat goes hand in hand with habitual changes, re-modelling himself as a neo-liberal, newly rich male. In Mrs. Popić's perception, lovers, big cars and expensive holidays have turned her husband into a caricature of himself. Her loss of social networks and resources in the course of their divorce stands in stark contrast to his social advancement. Demanding justice and social participation for Serbs in Croatia is a way for Mrs. Popić to restore her own demand for acknowledgment and participation.

By embracing religion and nationalism she simultaneously reproduces ethno-nationalist interpretative frameworks. This constitutes a form of everyday religion in so far as she searches for answers to existential questions in a context of individual and social crises and finds them in a religious community as well as in her nationalist commitment. In doing so she adopts categories of collective subjectivity that formed the legitimatory framework for the ethnic disintegration of Yugoslavia as well as for the horrid violence in the wars of the 1990s.

Analysing the interview it becomes clear how self-ethnicization as a means of dealing with the ethnic nationalism of the Croatian majority paradoxically functions as a form of biographical, social and political empowerment. The ethnic and religious reinterpretation of her biography and the practices connected to this enable her not only to come to terms with her divorce but also to present herself as an independent, working and secular woman and a good Serbian-Orthodox Christian at the same time. This can be seen in a form of Christian universalism she uses when she tries to persuade her students that all religions and ethnicities are of equal value. This can be seen as a re-interpretation of the secular multi-nationalism that was one of the foundations of Yugoslav nationalism. Along with her claim to independence and acknowledgment this multi-religious notion has its roots not in ethnicity or old Orthodox beliefs but rather is a transformation of a quite modern Yugoslav experience. To her, this attitude is not contradictory but adequately reflects an everyday reality that has undergone drastic changes.

In the context of this everyday religious practice the constitution of gender becomes part of a real fiction: imagined and real at the same time, flexibly adaptable while being socially pre-conditioned. Gender becomes part of everyday religious practice which can assume the appearance of an old order – exactly because it is so fractioned. At the same time it creates the possibility of new action schemes that allow individuals to cope with changing social circumstances, allowing for flexible negotiations in the context of fragile certainties.

Interpreting these changes as a resurgence of traditions or patriarchy must fall short since the break with tradition which is the basis for the constitution of gender in Yugoslavia and its successor states cannot be analysed. The concept of everyday religion offers a productive perspective to grasp the changing qualities of social conditions and helps to develop concepts of gender adequate to concrete practices in changing social and historical conditions.

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DETRADYCJONALIZACJA, GENDER I NOWE FORMY IDEOLOGII W BYŁEJ JUGOSŁAWII. ANALIZA PRZYPADKU Z PÓŁNOCNEJ CHORWACJI

Artykuł podejmuje polemikę z rozpowszechnionym przekonaniem o sprzyjaniu reakcyjnej etnicznonacjonalistycznej ideologii, rozwijającej się od lat 80. w krajach byłej Jugosławii, pojawieniu się patriarchalnych relacji genderowych lub ich rewitalizacji na podstawie tradycyjnych relacji płciowych. Odwołując się do zaproponowanej przez Detleva Claussena koncepcji *Alltagsreligion* (religii życia codziennego), a więc religii, która – w przeciwieństwie do nowoczesnych ideologii – nie rości sobie praw do prawdy, ale raczej oferuje zbiór sfragmentaryzowanych przekonań i twierdzeń, autorka poddaje analizie to, w jaki sposób zaproponowane w dyskursie etnicznym ujęcia płci pozwalają kobietom i mężczyznom radzić sobie z indywidualnymi i zbiorowymi kryzysami poprzez odwołanie się do treści ideologicznych. Teoretyczna dyskusja poparta jest analizą materiału empirycznego, zebranego podczas badań terenowych w północnej Chorwacji w 2008 roku oraz wywiadów biograficznych. Autorka przygląda się również temu, w jaki sposób codzienne religijne interpretacje stają się częścią naukowych przekonań na temat płci i relacji genderowych.

Słowa kluczowe: etnonacjonalizm, płeć kulturowa (gender), społeczeństwa postkomunistyczne, krytyka ideologii, badania biograficzne