The aim of this article is to outline the philosophical genealogy of pedagogical discourse based on Michel Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1977). The undertaken line of inquiry posits this reflection in light of the presupposed question about the core of pedagogical discourse since although in the course of the continuous academic debate stemming from Foucault’s writings many insightful works have emerged with regard to the critical analysis of the educational system and the inner logic underlying the functioning mode of the schools, and although the critical approach appears to be fundamental in the contemporary humanities, the very discourse seems to face an inter-conceptual resistance, which results in the fact that ‘with some hesitations and some dissent, contemporary critical traditions continue a nineteenth-century view of social redemption through schooling’ (Popkiewitz and Brennan 1998). In the article I put forward the possibility that the seemingly unresolvable theoretical resistance residing in the very essence of pedagogy as a scientific discourse, once reexamined in fact veils an inverted conception of pedagogical philosophy as the core of Foucault’s stance.

Keywords: Foucault, genealogy of pedagogy, pedagogical philosophy

INTRODUCTION

The incisiveness of the French philosopher’s thinking posits any consideration of the origins and the development of humanist sciences in an entirely new light and thereby requires any attempt at a similar critical analysis to consider the consequences of Foucault’s insight with its emphasis on unmasking the naïve thinking about the relation between power and knowledge. Further, it appears impossible to incorporate this kind of insight into the structure of a mere report without adopting its questioning and even censorious weight. Therefore, this investigation begins with an analysis of the concept presented in *Discipline and Punish* in order to proceed to a reflection on the development of pedagogy as an academic science.

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paying particular attention to the embryonic patterns and relations determining the inner logic of the process.

The emergence of pedagogy as a scientific discourse originates in a modern philosophical shift of emphasis toward the epistemological study of the subject. Although, unlike philosophy, pedagogy serves an apparent function of social praxis which means that it is inevitably connected to social reality along with its inner dynamics and influences, the very Greek origins of the word paidagogos (παιδαγωγός) denoting a slave accompanying and attending a child at school, literally guiding a child, point to the relations of pedagogy and modern philosophy – specifically the notion of guiding, which bears internal reference to discipline in Michel Foucault understanding of the word. In this primal context alone it is possible to consider the concept of subject and proceed to the notion of pedagogy as a science of education. Therefore, provided that discipline constitutes both the source as well as the horizon of the possible means to approaching the problem of genealogy of academic pedagogical discourse, I would like to follow Foucault’s investigation into the relation of power and subject which the French philosopher established as fundamental to any emanating social and cognitive perspective.

REEXAMINING FOUCAULT’S CONCEPTION OF POWER AND ITS INTANGIBLE MOVEMENT

In Discipline and Punish – within the context of the history of punishment – Foucault reveals power as the ulterior current flowing under the surface of social structures and penetrating it to its very core, the individual. Punishment is thus a trace or a manifestation of this underlying rule in the functioning of the society, which determines not only its external appearance but reaches as far as the individual as such, given that the very relation of the ‘I’ and society is in fact an abstract product of naiveté. According to Foucault, to think of the I as separate and independent of its society is itself an outcome of a false reasoning. The system of punishment is neither constricted to nor enclosed within its own definition. On the contrary, it undergoes the historical process, or to be more precise: it generates the historical movement due to the fact that its own dynamic is solely determined by the imperative of power instead of justice, regardless of the fact that it may appear otherwise. Surveying these manifestations of power, Foucault traces its imperceptible movement – its evolution and purview which paradoxically establish the reality of social processes. By reversing the perspective of perception the author of Discipline and Punish unveils an entirely different image of social reality. As a result of this critique the letter ceases to constitute a preexisting fact created by the invariable relations between tangible extremities originating in the epistemological relation of subject and object, commonly perceived as unquestionable. Even though upon this very relation our perception of social reality as such is founded, Foucault assumes a relentlessly contrarian stance towards such axiomatic claims. Even though the very self-evident nature of this relation has already been doubted by the philosophers, Foucault
The genealogy of pedagogy as a scientific discourse in light of *Discipline and Punish*... aims his critique at the assumption of its primal nature. He refutes the obviousness of this self-evident premise and unveils the underlying relation of power and its subject. Likewise, the author of *Discipline and Punish* implies that we are prone to falsely presuppose the transparent polarity of the subject-object relation, which in his mind is hardly a relation at all. His argument is derived from Hegel’s dialectics where the relation is not equal, due to the active and dominant role of the I (Spirit) which constitutes transformation in the sphere of the other (nature). For other philosophers, such as Theodor Adorno and Jacques Derrida, the un-transparentness of the transition from the sphere of *subjectum* to the sphere of *objectum* is the primal source of ontological violence. Foucault also claims that there is a power and its object – furthermore, power is in fact faceless and thus manifests itself only within and via its own movement and operation.

However, before discussing the *microphysics of power* as the author of *Discipline and Punish* calls it, I would like to investigate the object of power. The obvious question arises: whether it is the individual or perhaps society? Admittedly, upon initial reflection it appears that both elements are, yet Foucault’s investigations arrive at a profounder level, pointing at the body.

But we can surely accept the general proposition that, in our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political economy’ of the body [...] it is always the body that is at issue – the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission. [...] But the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection [...] the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body (Foucault 1977).

On the basis of the founding relation between power and the body Foucault constructs subsequent concepts serving to reveal this source, since from a perspective in which the body converts into a specific subject of power it becomes necessary to provide a form of knowledge about the body as well as a means of controlling it. Thus the *political technology* of the body is ‘diffuse, rarely formulated in continuous, systematic discourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods’ (Foucault 1977). Elsewhere Foucault claims that power is neither an attribute nor even anything conceptually substantial. To comprehend power in these naïve materializing categories is derived from our cognitive necessity, which in turn is a result of concealing strategies of power presenting itself through leverage and oppression. Hence we may speak of a *microphysics of power*:

‘Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who “do not have it”; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them’ (Foucault 1977). Therefore, the social reality becomes a sphere of operating, and yet veiled concealed disciplinary forces and ceaseless manipulation which reaches further
than the conceptual borders of the relation between power and its object – it penetrates the very object and thereby constitutes its identity.

This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behavior, the general form of the law or government; that, although there is continuity [...], there is neither analogy nor homology, but a specificity of mechanism and modality (Foucault 1977).

Thus by means of breaking binary thinking, Foucault reveals the theoretical means of oppression in order to thereafter trace its historical dynamics and metamorphosis in the context of the punishing practices as a basic form of its manifestation. He challenges the perspective of naive thinking, according to which power is a mere agent of justice (initially conceived in the Middle Ages as God’s law only to be transformed into tribunals, decisions, and common law), and the subject submitted to retribution. Foucault labels the varying forms of punishing: a theatre, mourning, a lesson and a sign which have been shifting in meaning from manifestation of force characteristic of the Middle Ages to sophisticated solidification of the basic presupposition of the validity and justness of the system.

However, it appears that the most important phenomenon in the ritual of punishment is in fact the category of a sign (Foucault 1977) regardless of whether it is concealed or a subject of public perception. Through signs the authority operates, as with them not only the social order but the moral is also consolidated. Paradoxically, absence of the image in the execution of punishment constitutes a sign as well, which is bound to be read and thereby integrated into the very process of individual understanding. Foucault indicates a gradual obliteration of the face of power correlated with simultaneous prevalence of the activity of punishing in the advance of its strategies. Therefore, what endures within the scope of public perception is in fact the punishment itself, only in various forms, whereas its subject appears veiled and absent. As a result, we do not raise the question ‘who punishes?’ since by merely agreeing to it we become dispensers of the punishment ourselves. In view of this fact, no one is responsible on the account of there being a higher order. According to Foucault the origins of the discussed phenomenon reside in the fact that discipline and a specific education gradually took over the place of the regime, since to punish means to exercise. It is precisely due to the punishment’s function as sign that such a transition has been possible.

CONFIGURATION OF POWER
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PEDAGOGICAL DISCOURSE

The above investigation is essential to the commenced inquiry into the philosophical origins of the pedagogical discourse as well as the need to perceive pedagogy from the standpoint of its extensive scope and multidimensional functioning. As was mentioned previously the specific construction of our cognitive apparatus is responsible for the way we perceive, or rather fail to perceive, social reality. It is inherent in the mode of observing the world. A similar question arises, whether there is a corresponding structure responsible for
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the way we think. German philosophy, Heidegger in particular, points to Western metaphysics as the source of the substantial perception of phenomena, whereas Foucault emphasizes the relation: power and knowledge (as surpassing the individual) and thereby he invalidates the myth of neutrality of knowledge and science set against politics. Thus he claims: ‘In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge’ (Foucault 1977).

However, if we are to speak of punishing, discipline and education we are bound to face an inevitable intrinsic connection with morality. In this context Foucault’s analysis approaches the idea of the soul as another point of naïve certainty. What is the soul? Foucault answers: ‘one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect’ (Foucault 1977). It appears therefore that the soul functions as the intangible lance of consciousness.

A similar inquiry is delivered by Astrid Męczkowska in her book *Podmiot i pedagogika* (Męczkowska 2006), wherein she points to the modern notion of the subject (delivered by Kant and Hegel) as the origin of pedagogy. The subject surfacing the abyss of Cartesian total uncertainty emanates a domain of the only possible truth – the intersubjective sphere of cognition. Thus there is no outer instance for reason and the only path to be taken by a man is to surpass the constraining subjective sphere toward the epistemological autonomy of the intersubjective premise founding the free will as such. Although the primal Cartesian stance was purely of an epistemological facet, which has been further developed by phenomenology, the social consequences of his idea demanded some new applied needs; hence the mission of educating individuals to become subjects. Whether the subject would appear either dehumanized or not depends on the way we understand the subjectivity – that is either as the potential ideal of a man or, antithetically, as the oppression of what is human. The emergent idea of the intersubjective sphere as the true way of being of the subject is essentially connected with Hegel’s notion of absolute Spirit which actualizes itself within the movement of history. Accordingly, the sphere attributes a responsibility and a role to the individual and the society as we now face a collective subject. At this precise theoretical stage is where pedagogy emerges as an academic discipline (Męczkowska 2006).

However, once again the author of *Discipline and Punish* makes a shift of the emphasis within the thought’s construction in order to reveal a new perspective on the problem. To understand this stance, the notion of the soul needs to be recalled:

This real, noncorporeal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power. On this reality reference, various concepts have been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism (Foucault 1977).

Męczkowska had previously indicated the integrity of the discourse: subject – morality. The autonomous subject, in opposition to the autonomy characteristic of a child, possesses
the ability to pronounce moral judgments – the ability which in turn grounds his autonomy. At this point Foucault’s analysis penetrates the problem more deeply to arrive at its critical point, where power equals knowledge. This very point is the soul. Thus the Enlightened Reason is in fact already a manifestation of power – the panoptical eye within the individual upon which his identity is constituted. The idea of Podmiot i pedagogika reveals the latter as if in a dialectical relation toward the discourse of subjectivity. Dialectical meaning that pedagogy as an autonomous discourse understands and recognizes itself in light of philosophical discourse of subjectivity regardless of whether we speak of either the subject’s hegemony or, after Derrida, about its absence and crisis. ‘The absence is radically required: the total absence of the subject and of the object of the statement – the death of the writer and/or the disappearance of the object that has been able to describe – does not prevent the text from meaning’ (Derrida 2011). More importantly, Męczkowska indicates the inner contradictions dwelling in all pedagogical projects aiming to in any way negate the basic claims of subjectivity and thereby to transcend the bounds of the discourse demarcated by these claims. Essential here is the primal association of rising toward the subjectivity-autonomy process with a moral and social function. The investigation delivered in Podmiot i pedagogika allows us to trace the forming stages of the identity of pedagogy as shaped under the influence of the discourse of subjectivity or somewhat within its context. As the author indicates in the fourth chapter, pedagogy proceeds from diverse models of parenting styles characterized by the presupposed aim and forming the positive stage (Rousseau, Herbart, Hessen); through the negative stage encompassing all the conceptions devoid of the parenting facet; towards the final dialectical stage endeavoring to reconcile both inner impulses of pedagogy – either to remain locked within the boundaries of its concept, or to surpass them.

Still, between these impulses to interiorize or exteriorize a phenomenon occurs which Męczkowska names the “betrayal of the pedagogical reason” (zdrada pedagogicznego rozumu). It originates in the fact that pedagogy, along with the humanities, is condemned to the process of instrumentalization characteristic of the scientific apogee of the age of Enlightenment, when Reason becomes a tool only and pedagogy is recognized as science (Męczkowska 2006). It appears that at this point attention needs to be drawn to this particular instant in the history of pedagogy, since it seems to cast light upon the very essence of all social sciences when deployed in a dialogical stance with Discipline and Punish. Thus the conclusion drawn by Męczkowska should be once again juxtaposed with Foucault’s postmodern diagnosis of the Enlightenment’s meta-narrations. Męczkowska accuses Reason of being degraded to the function of a serving tool for a mere interest. However, the very degradation of Reason appears intrinsically resistant to such accusations given it was merely an inevitable outcome of the prior process of applying the scientific method in pedagogy as such, provided the latter constitutes a causative medium between the suppositions inherent in the vision of the human being comprehended as a subject and the social reality. In this context pedagogy has become a result of the primal fault of applying philosophy to the sphere of praxis, which in the age of scientism has become the most evident (Męczkowska 2006).

Depending on the social discourse, as broadly approached in pedagogy, the different meanings are emphasized: scientific, mission etc. However, postmodernism essentially establishes a hypothesis that the technique constitutes a fulfillment of the Enlightenment’s
Reason, its core. Therefore, to claim that Reason has in any way become its tool appears somewhat diffuse. In the light of Foucault’s analysis the subject, identified with Reason, as an object of social sciences is merely a correlate of modern power, and even possibly its product. It appears that conception of Reason which was reformulated in the age of scientism as the tool of interest constitutes the theoretical frame of Foucault’s diagnosis, whereas the intention and inner philosophical impulse of the latter seems to be directed toward the interior of any approached configuration of social phenomena. Thus we may read in *Discipline and Punish:*

But let there be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A ‘soul inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body (Foucault 1977).

If we were to absorb the whole spectrum of the theoretical consequences issuing from the *technology of power,* it would become easy to recognize that every conception of the human being is condemned to bear a mark of functionality. Moreover, in order to remain attuned to the depth of Foucault’s insight it appears correct to claim that it is our very thinking, or what we accept as its nature, that may in fact constitute a shape of the concealed influence of power. In this light pedagogy, given its function to mediate between theoretical reflections on the human being and social reality and praxis, seems condemned to naïve solutions.

**THE PARADOXES OF THE CRITICAL TRENDS IN PEDAGOGY**

At this point a need for a brief consideration of the contemporary approaches in pedagogy arises, in order to illustrate and reveal the contradictions and problems the discourse encounters. One such instance appears to be the dialogical concept of education of Paulo Freire1, the founder of the critical pedagogy movement, derived, to some extent, from the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The thesis that underlies the theoretical claims of this movement bears a definite critical mark most adequately presented by Shaull: “There is no such thing as a neutral education process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of generations into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes the ‘practice of freedom’, the means by which men and women deal critically with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world” (Shaull 1970). The first negative and critical part of Shaull’s observation seems to adhere perfectly to Foucault’s stance, yet the last positive claim may appear somewhat inconsistent since it almost instantly provokes a doubt – how is this unspoiled education achievable? The question echoes even louder when we recall Freire’s postulate wherein the

1 Compare: “Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teachers cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers... They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow” (Freire 1994).
author of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* coins a specific notion of the dialogue by claiming that ‘through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teachers cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers [...] They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow’ (Freire 1994). It appears that the method of education that advances a postulate of equality of the partners in the educational process (Rutkowiak 1992) in order to avoid the authoritarian oppression simultaneously silently presupposes either equalizing dynamics of the very process in which two entirely different worlds of a child and teacher are equalized for the sake of finding a means of dialogue, or balances dangerously at the verge of falling into defragmentation of the interaction into two separate monologues.

If, therefore, we adopt the claim of the dialogue of two irreducibly diverse worlds we accept that the difference is of a cultural facet – the child is devoid of the same symbolic competence as an adult partner. However, Hans-Georg Gadamer insists on the positive meaning of culture as delivered through language and opening the dimensions of our understanding (Gadamer 1977) and thereby constituting a necessary context for any dialogue. The author of *Truth and Method* attributes the ontological status to philosophical hermeneutics thereby situating the reality in the idealist, spiritual dimension, which points to the origins of the dialogical conception of his philosophy in Hegelian idealism, according to which the culture itself is an exteriorized Spirit (Hegel 1977). Therefore, it appears that the first step in education should consist in providing the child with a symbolic competence with the persistent postulate for dialogue in mind in order to avoid authoritarian oppression, and yet building the pedagogical relation in its primal meaning. Still at this point, should the dialogical stance prevail it faces yet another intrinsic complication since ‘power not only represses but it also makes possible the knowledge that constitutes culture – any culture’ (Svi Shapiro et al. 1995).

Another area of problem-infusing factors located in the emerging pedagogical projects is the ‘political economy of education’ in the capitalist society, extensively discussed by Paul Willis in his famous book *Learning to Labor* and later by Peter McLaren in his equally influential *Schooling as a Ritual Performance*. Both critics trace relations of power among concealed alliances of micro- and macro-political origins to reveal not only the oppressors but the elusive dynamics of oppression penetrating the system of education. Still, since McLaren ‘believes in the intervening role of the educator’ (Marc Pruyn and Luis M. Huerta-Charles 2005) his critical insight appears less radical on the one hand and perhaps less consequent on the other when compared with Foucault’s claims.

The indicated problem is also investigated by Tomasz Szkudlarek, who addresses the whole spectrum of consequences induced by the neoliberal perspective and influence

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2 Freire recognizes such an approach as radically democratic since, as Gadotti points out, it requires “directivity and freedom at the same time, with no authoritarianism from the teacher and no licentious freedom from the pupils” (Gadotti 1994).

3 Tomasz Szkudlarek and Astrid Męczkowska-Christiansen among other Polish scholars (for instance Zbyszko Melosik and Helena Ostrowicka) are the acknowledged authors of works on Foucault. For further information see the article *On the Reception of Foucauldian Ideas in Pedagogical Research* by Helena Ostrowicka (Ostrowicka 2011: 433–444) where the author investigates the reception of the French thinker’s ideas by the Polish scholars with an emphasis on the ‘application trend’ (Ostrowicka 2011: 435).
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on the system of education. Here the manifestations of the configuration of power, which now resides in the economy, become evident and traceable within the accents surfacing the language, as in the terms: ‘human capital’ or ‘human resources’ (Szkudlarek et al. 2002).

**CONCLUSION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE**

Hence, simultaneously with the ongoing intrinsic process of reorientation within the philosophical discourse in which ethics, according to Emmanuel Levinas, becomes a *philosophia prima* (Levinas 1961), pedagogy focuses on the ethical aspect of education. In the post-postmodern age, pedagogical discourse faces a difficult challenge, given that philosophy ceases to deliver direct solutions. The issue is also addressed by Teresa Hejnicka-Bezwińska, who claims that due to the end of the meta-narrations proclaimed by Foucault we face a crisis of meaning itself, and thereby normative pedagogy has arrived at a critical point and needs to be reconsidered (Hejnicka-Bezwińska 2012: 80). Accordingly, a conclusion may be drawn that if we were to consequently adopt Foucault’s radical stance there seems to exist neither any concept of education nor pedagogy that would not fall apart under his critical, almost annihilating, gaze. Further, it may seem that as long as the humanist debate remains under the major influence of French critical thought and its style of diagnosing social phenomena – devoid of positive solutions – there is a loitering danger of educational chaos. Yet another equally plausible, although contrary, conclusion occurs: if we were to redeem the intersection of praxis and theory from such nihilistic rejection we would presuppose and reinstall the Western Subject along with its problematic background.

However, at this turning point a third possibility arises and gains actuality when we recall that among his *stricte* critical insights into the foundations of sciences which have led to the presented critique of pedagogy, Foucault mysteriously hints ‘I am not a writer, a philosopher, a great figure of intellectual life: I am a teacher’ (Foucault 1988). Perhaps this emerging critical idea of education neither blindly adheres to the oppressive weight of educating nor succumbs to the inevitable negative side of critique as such; on the contrary it seems to advance a new conception of understanding which essentially comprises both elements. It appears that Foucault sees philosophy as a method of teaching to understand the world, provided that understanding is conceived here as a dialectical perception of the phenomena, revealing its inner laws and illusions. This shift of emphasis in the philosophical investigations advanced by the French thinker and directed toward its pedagogical aspect incites somewhat a very primal Socratic impulse inherent in philosophy which nonetheless may appear contaminated by the possibility of domination; yet, on the one hand this very impulse enables philosophy to resist the coercive influence of a purely scientific paradigm consuming humanist discourse, while on the other hand due to its critical weight allows it to avoid the lure of becoming an

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4 One of the significant critical references to Foucault’s writings is made by Gayatri Spivak in her famous essay *Can the Subaltern Speak* where she underscores that Foucault’s critique of Subject lacks transparency since it is based on premises that are not subjected to the critical analysis and so the very conception with its oppression inducing qualities prevails (Spivak 1988).
ideology. Perhaps if we were to juxtapose the critical pedagogical project of Foucault with that of Freire or McLaren the major incompatibility would reside in both the consistency of the presented critique and its focus. Foucault appears to insist on creating a critical understanding or attention as an aim, whereas Freire accentuates the idea of transforming reality via a new dialogical mode of education. Critical vigilance which resides at the center of philosophical investigation requires deep engagement in the historical and theoretical context of any phenomenal configuration approached in its course as well as, given its pedagogical aspect, the ability to stand its ground, to remain detached from the data given as obvious and thereby highly deceptive in its claim of being irrefutable.

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GENEALOGIA PEDAGOGIKI JAKO DYSKURSU NAUKOWEGO NA PODSTAWIE *NADZOROWAĆ I KARAĆ* – W KIERUNKU PARADOKSU FILOZOFII PEDAGOGICZNEJ

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zarysowanie filozoficznej genealogii pedagogiki na podstawie *Nadzorować i karać* Michela Foucaulta. Obrany kierunek rozważań stawia je w obliczu ponownego pytania o korzeń dyskursu pedagogicznego, pomimo iż w toku trwającej akademickiej debaty zapoczątkowanej i inspirowanej pismami Foucaulta powstało wiele wnikliwych prac dotyczących krytycznych analiz systemu edukacji i wewnętrznej logiki funkcjonowania szkół. Podejście krytyczne zdaje się również fundamentalne dla współczesnej humanistyki, sama debata jednak zdaje się napotykać wewnętrznojęzykowy opór, co z kolei sprawia, że „z pewną dozą wahania i sprzeciwu współczesne tradycje krytyczne podtrzymują dziewiętnastowieczny pogląd społecznego odkupienia poprzez nauczanie” (Popkievitz i Brennan 1998). W artykule wskazuję, że ponowna refleksja nad oporem obecnym w samym korzeniu pedagogiki – w sferie jej istotowego przenikania w praxis – pozwala odkryć odwroconą perspektywę problemu, a w niej koncepcję pedagogicznej filozofii jako rdzenia poglądów francuskiego myśliciela.

Słowa kluczowe: Foucault, genealogia pedagogiki, filozofia pedagogiczna