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**‘US’ AND ‘THEM’ IN THE LANGUAGE
OF CONSERVATIVE ISLAMOPHOBIA.
REFERENTIAL AND PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES
IN POLISH RIGHT-WING PRESS DISCOURSE
ON THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN 2015**

As Vincent Geisser noted in his book, *La Nouvelle Islamophobie*, islamophobia can be defined as a form of cultural racism which puts emphasis especially on religion (Islam) as the agent of distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, based usually on a phantasmatic idea of Islam and Muslims. The islamophobic phenomenon increased radically in Poland during the peak of the migration crisis in the second half of 2015, following numerous press articles and columns which provide a background for such prejudice. The right-wing press titles provided space for authors voicing discriminative opinions about (mostly Muslim) refugees and immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Using a Discourse-Historical Approach (Wodak, Reisigl), the author analysed which predicational and referential strategies are used to designate social actors and where the line of distinction is drawn between the categories of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in right-wing press discourse on the migration crisis. The analysis suggests that right-wing publicists distinguish two different subcategories of ‘Them’: a) refugees and immigrants (usually Muslim) and b) the liberal political and media elites. Therefore, the analysed texts could be perceived as examples of ‘conservative islamophobia’, as defined by Monika Bobako, in which European Christian identity is the basis for prejudice against Muslims and liberal advocates of multi-culturalism.

Keywords: right-wing press, 2015 migration crisis, islamophobia, Poland

INTRODUCTION

The 2015 migration crisis in Europe¹ ignited an enormous increase in islamophobic attitudes in Polish society. A discursive shift² manifested itself in a larger number of islamophobic

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¹ The crisis has arisen mostly due to an armed conflict in Syria and resulted in uncontrolled inflow of foreigners to the European Union. The humanitarian tragedy caused by the conflict, a distant prospect of its ending and destabilization of the whole region (among many other tragic consequences) have pushed about 8 million people to leave their homes. Moreover, the number of migrants in European Union has increased almost five times in comparison to 2014 and also included citizens of Afghanistan, Iraq and many other countries. Over 4,000 people died in 2015 crossing the Mediterranean Sea (Legut and Pędziwiatr 2016: 672–673).

² Understood after Michał Krzyżanowski as a mean to denote local, microlevel appropriations of discursive changes, which are actor-specific responses toward social, political, and economic macro-level transformations (Krzyżanowski 2017: 78).

utterances in public discourse during the peak months of the migration crisis³ (Legut and Pędziwiatr 2018: 43; Krzyżanowski 2017: 78). General aversion against Muslims and Islam, which has resonated in social research since the 9/11 attacks, has turned into a serious problem and has become visible in real life (physical violence, insults, etc.) and on the internet (Cegielski, Górak-Sosnowska, 2016). At the beginning of 2015, before the peak moment of the crisis, the attitude towards refugees in Polish society was generally positive. At that time, 76% of Polish citizens agreed that foreigners who are persecuted in their own countries should have a right to settle in Poland (Kowalczyk 2015: 1–2). An analysis conducted in the autumn of 2015 and in the following year, suggested that Polish people's attitude towards the refugees from Muslim countries had drastically changed. In more cases feelings were clearly more negative than positive and more often attitudes supported isolation and the use of violence against refugees (Hansen, Świdorska and Winiewski 2016: 13; Feliksiak 2017: 3). The right-wing political parties who competed in the 2015 parliamentary elections and related media might have had a major influence on the change of views during the electoral campaign⁴. The negative attitude towards refugees from Muslim countries has been shared by many Polish right-wing publicists (Wrzosek 2016: 412), who have often radically criticized the welcoming migration policies of the European Union, as well as Islam and the cultures of Middle-Easterners and Northern Africans.

ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE MEDIA

Prejudice⁵ against Islam and its believers, commonly known as 'islamophobia', has been explained widely by many researchers. Some of them, like Ferruh Yilmaz, consider it only as religious prejudice (Yilmaz 2016: 19). Others, like Vincent Geisser in his book *Le Nouvelle Islamophobie*⁶, picture it as a new form of cultural racism, in which prejudice against religion is the main component (Geisser 2009: 11). For the purpose of this analysis, I chose a notion of 'islamophobia' as coined by Monika Bobako, according to which islamophobia can be understood on three levels. On the first level, prejudice could be a result of a general fear of the unknown⁷, where the religious belief serves as a criterion for considering someone as the

³ According to UNHCR data, in August, September, October and November 2015 over 125,000 refugees and immigrants arrived on Mediterranean Sea coasts in Greece, Italy and Spain each month (UNHCR 2015: 1).

⁴ The research showed, that the skeptical attitude towards refugees is mostly visible among voters of right-wing parties – 65% of KORWiN voters, 64% of Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) voters and 62% Kukiz '15 voters were against accepting refugees (Feliksiak 2017: 7).

⁵ Understood after van Dijk as a cognitive and social phenomenon, which is not only a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions, but also shared form of social representation in group members, acquired during socialisation and transformed and enacted in social communication and interaction (Van Dijk 1984: 13).

⁶ The references are based on the Polish edition of the book, translated by Ewa Cylwik (Geisser 2009).

⁷ According to Central Statistical Office of Poland, there are 5,108 Muslims living in Poland (Gudaszewski 2016: 227). The experts estimate the number at approximately 30,000–40,000 people (Cegielski and Górak-Sosnowska 2016: 154). The research conducted on believers in official religious associations in Poland in 2009–2011 has showed that there are approximately 3,800 people in the largest Muslim association, Liga Muzułmańska w RP (the Muslim League in Polish Republic), 1,132 in Muzułmański Związek Religijny w RP

'other'. On the second level, prejudice could be grounded in an islamophobic xenophobia, which often develops from the insecurity, helplessness and confusion that has arisen on the first level. Such a variant of xenophobia relies on the confirmation and emphasis of a European or national identity. Unlike the first type of islamophobia, this prejudice does not only remain in the sphere of personal feelings. It could also result in segregationist postulates and activities, such as anti-immigrant demonstrations and campaigns, assaults against people of different origins, who could be considered Muslim, and discrimination in the public sphere. The third and the most radical form is anti-Muslim racism, which is a form of cultural racism (Bobako 2016: 148–149).

According to Teun van Dijk, the media play a central role in reproducing prejudice in contemporary European and North American societies (van Dijk 1993: 242) as in the case of islamophobia. In recent years, the media in Poland have pictured Islam mostly in a negative or at least a neutral way (Wilczura 2011: 49), through exaggerating the scale of Muslim terrorism and identifying the religion mostly with its fanatical and conservative believers (Górska 2013: 210). Through the media portrayal of Islam using simplifying and discriminative stereotypes, the receivers (readers, listeners, viewers) perceive the religion as obscurantist and confrontational. In this image, Muslims usually are associated with certain elements like bowing during prayer, angry mobs, tightly covered women and bearded men (Geisser 2009: 28). The media, however, do not create the prejudice themselves, but they systematize certain beliefs about Islam with specific choices of content for articles, images provided to readers and viewers, authorities commenting on the topic, and the ways of portraying Muslim public figures. The media coverage on Islam appears, therefore, as some kind of 'investigation', in which the chosen experts or even the journalists, who do their research on Islam and use professional vocabulary related to the religion, are situated as experts on the topic (Geisser 2009: 30). The Muslim fundamentalists are shown in such discourse as discriminative, stereotypical Muslims, fulfilling the receivers' unspoken request for an assessment of Islamist terrorist threat, instead of knowledge about Islam and its believers (Geisser 2009: 33).

CONSERVATIVE ISLAMOPHOBIA

This analysis focuses on a specific type of islamophobia defined by Monika Bobako as 'conservative islamophobia', which is clearly visible in the Polish right-wing press. A religious motivation is primary in this kind of prejudice – it emphasizes the Christian character of Europe and portrays the conflict as an antagonism between two religions (Bobako 2017: 312). Conservative islamophobia is, therefore, pictured as a defence of religion and the Christian identity of Europe against the expansion of Islam. The latter is pictured as an alien and immoral religion, whose main objective is to destroy Christianity. As well, a threat to the integrity of

(Muslim Religious Association in Polish Republic), and approximately 45–60 people in three lesser organizations (Ciecielağ and Haponiuk 2013: 121–125). Moreover, there is a large discrepancy between the estimates of the experts and those of Polish society: Poles believe that about 7% of Polish population is Muslim (meaning there would be 2.6 million Muslims in Poland) (Pędzwiatr 2017: 416).

the community is positioned as the main problem of Islam, instead of radical Islam's rejection of modern liberal, democratic and Enlightenment ideas. The narrative of such prejudice shows that Muslims are not the only enemies of the European, Christian values, but also Western supporters of secularization, atheists, cultural liberals, secular humanists, and anthropocentric Christians. The potential damage caused by Islam to the European Christian identity is juxtaposed with the damage done by the post-French Revolution and post-Enlightenment emancipatory and countercultural social movements (Bobako 2017: 313–314).

RESEARCH MATERIAL

The research was conducted on press texts from the peak moment of the migration crisis in 2015, the months of August, September, October and November. These were the months when a shift in discourse on migration and Islam took place. The texts were selected through a search for the keywords '(im)migrant(s)', 'refugee(s)', 'Muslim(s)' and 'Islam' in relation to 2015 migration crisis⁸. The quantity of such texts increased especially in mid- to late September (see Table 1.)

Table 1. Appearance of selected texts in specific magazines per month

Month	Title			
	<i>Najwyższy Czas!</i>	<i>W Sieci</i>	<i>Do Rzeczy</i>	<i>Gazeta Polska</i>
August	6	2	4	3
September	13	46	24	29
October	7	7	9	9
November	15	4	3	5
Total: 186	41	59	40	46

The research sample comprises 186 texts from four magazines, including articles, columns, commentaries and interviews. The chosen group of magazines consists of the best-selling titles related to the right-wing political scene in Poland⁹. Most of them are conservative weekly magazines which openly declare their sympathy towards PiS (the ruling party since the October 2015 elections): *Gazeta Polska*, *Do Rzeczy* and *W Sieci* (currently titled *Sieci*). *Najwyższy Czas!*, a populist far-right weekly/biweekly¹⁰ magazine connected with controversial MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke and his political parties, was also included in the analysis¹¹.

⁸ The lexeme '(im)migrant' also appears in texts on migration from Ukraine to Poland, from Mexico to the United States and others not directly or indirectly concerning the 2015 migration crisis.

⁹ According to data from Związek Kontroli Dystrybucji Prasy (The Association for Control of Press Distribution) published in late August/September, 2015 on wirtualnemediamedia.pl website (Kurdupski 2015).

¹⁰ The frequency of publishing has changed on numerous occasions – during the selected period „Najwyższy Czas!” has appeared six times as biweekly and five times as weekly.

¹¹ At that time Korwin-Mikke was a leader of a party called KORWiN, which was an abbreviation of Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (Coalition of a Renewal of the Republic – Freedom and Hope). Despite of not being noted by ZKDP, the presence of „Najwyższy Czas!”, however, should be also justified

RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE – THE DISCOURSE-HISTORICAL APPROACH

The analysis is based primarily on the Discourse-Historical Approach, an interdisciplinary research approach developed by Ruth Wodak and her co-workers (Reisigl 2017: 44–45). The approach has been used for the analysis of discourses on migration through the past decades (for example Wodak and Van Dijk 2000; Krzyżanowski and Wodak 2008; Delanty, Wodak and Jones 2011; Wodak and Matouschek 1993; Wodak and Van Leeuwen 1999). The approach is explained more widely in, i.a., Wodak's chapter in *Methods of Critical Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Wodak and Meyer 2001) – however, to make the research method coherent for the case study, I will define the most important terms used for the analysis.

The concept of 'discourse' as used in this article is drawn from Wodak (Wodak 2001: 66) and is understood as "a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically related semiotic types [genres]". The term 'discourse' should be distinguished from 'text', which is defined as a materially durable product of linguistic action (Wodak 2003: 136). It is also important to mention the understanding of the term 'topic', which will also be used in the analysis – the 'topic' here is understood as "the most 'important' or 'summarizing' idea that underlies the meanings of a sequence of sentences in a discourse" (van Dijk 1984: 56). The notion of 'context' here should not be concerned only in terms of time and space and socio-political conditions, but it should take into account four levels, of which the first is descriptive and the three others constitute the DHA's context theory:

1. the immediate, language or text internal co-text,
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships among utterances, texts, genres and discourses,
3. the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 'context of situation' (middle-range theories),
4. the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to (Weiss and Wodak 2003: 22).

Hence, the elements that should be taken into account include the intertextual relations between the analysed texts and texts published in other periods, by different senders; relations among the genres (aforementioned articles, columns, interviews, as well as news, TV coverage, speeches, academic publications, holy texts of Islam etc.) and relations among discourses on various topics (national security, sovereignty in the European Union, crime, unemployment, social policies). In addition, certain socio-political elements should be considered, especially on a global scale, such as the ongoing conflicts in Middle East and North Africa, the activity of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), humanitarian tragedies following the migration crisis of 2015, the European Union's refugee policy (Legut and Pędziwiatr 2017: 676–677), the Visegrad governments' refusals to accept refugees, and the rise of right-wing populism in

in case of this analysis due to Janusz Korwin-Mikke's parties' popularity in 2014–2015, which resulted in relatively high election results for a far-right populist party.

Western countries. Moreover, many factors related to Poland's socio-political situation should be taken into consideration, including the politicisation of the migration crisis topic in Poland (Krzyżanowski 2017: 76–77; Pędzwiatr 2016: 430), the Polish government's responses to the EU's refugee policy (Legut and Pędzwiatr 2017: 678–690), the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland, the ongoing rivalry between conservative and liberal parties, and the Estera Foundation's campaign for helping only Syrian-Christian refugees¹². The political affiliations of certain magazines and authors should be considered as well. Some aspects of Poland's ethnic and religious structure could provide important contextual information: the general ethnic homogeneity of Poland (Buchowski 2016: 52–53), including the very low share of Muslims in the religious structure of Polish society, the specifics of the Polish Muslim community (Narkowicz and Pędzwiatr 2016: 444–445; Nalborczyk 2006), and the important role of the Catholic Church in the Polish public sphere¹³ (Pędzwiatr 2015: 168–169).

The main points of reference for this case study are the three topics about foreigners specified by Wodak and Matouschek (1993: 234) which lead to the postulate of immigrant limitation and control:

1. The foreigners ('they') spoil our socio-economic interests (emphasis on the threat to the economic interests because of competition).
2. The foreigners ('they') differ from us in terms of culture, mentality, etc. (emphasis on the threat to the cultural order).
3. The foreigners ('they') are involved in activities that are perceived as negative or are considered criminal (emphasis on the threat to the social order).

REFERENTIAL AND PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES IN POLISH RIGHT-WING DISCOURSE ON THE MIGRATION CRISIS

The purpose of this paper is to show which discursive strategies are used in islamophobic discourse in the Polish right-wing press. The 'strategy' could be defined after Wodak and Reisigl as a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44).

Due to space limitations, I will focus only on the referential and predicational strategies and the linguistic means by which they are manifested. Referential strategies are used to construct and represent social actors. Possible means include membership categorisation devices, such as biological, naturalising and depersonalising metaphors and metonymies as well as figures of speech representing the whole (*pars pro toto*) or a whole standing for the part (*totum pro parte*). The predicational strategies serve to provide constructed social actors with

¹² Estera Foundation, ran by half-Syrian activist Miriam Shaded, helped Syrian Christians arrive in Poland in 2015 with the tacit approval of Polish authorities (Legut and Pędzwiatr 2017: 684). However, Shaded's activity has been largely focused on portraying Christians as the main victims of the ongoing conflict in Syria while at the same time demonizing the Muslims (Pędzwiatr 2016: 431).

¹³ Catholicism is notably associated with Polishness and also (in most cases) serves as a fundament for Polish nationalism (Buchowski 2016: 61; Pędzwiatr 2017: 424).

predications, which could take a form of stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. Some referential strategies could be considered as predicational as well, due to the involvement of denotatively as well as connotatively deprecatory or appreciative labelling of the social actors (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 45). Table 2 presents referential and predicational strategies drawn from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 48–52), which were visibly present in the analysed texts. As mentioned above, the conservative islamophobic discourse in Poland is directed not only against Muslims (in this case Muslim refugees), but also against liberals and the left, who are purported to stand against traditional European values. The distinction between 'Us' and 'Them' would be an obvious simplification in this case, so I split the 'Them' category into two groups, which (A) represents the Muslims – the direct targets of islamophobia, in this case mostly in reference to refugees from conflict regions and (B) the ideological opponents of the islamophobes. The category of 'Us' is assigned here to the sender and people he/she considers as his/her group of identification. Later in the article I will describe discursive strategies that were present in analysed texts and show how they refer to each of the three categories.

Table 2. Predicational and referential strategies used in the analysed texts

Strategy	Us	Them (A)	Them (B)
Collectivisation	Us, nation, society, national communities	Muslim community, Muslim society, mass, crowd, (hundreds of/dozens of) thousands of refugees/immigrants	–
Spatialisation	Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Europe, Central/Eastern Europe	Saudi Arabia, Syria	Germany, Austria, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, France, England, Germany, Sweden, Western Europe, the West
De-spatialisation	Poles, Europeans, Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs	Arabs, Africans, Middle-Easterners, foreigners (<i>obcokrajowcy</i>), outlanders (<i>cudzoziemcy</i>)	Germans, French
Explicit dissimilation	–	stranger (<i>obcy</i>)	–
Actionalization/ Professionalization	Political scientists, analysts, sociologists, priests, politicians, film directors	Immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, economic immigrants, newcomers, fugitives, frauds, invaders, robbers, welfare immigrants	Politicians, elites, media, journalists, columnists, chairman
Somatization	Rational, "Polish backwater" (<i>polski ciemnogród</i>)	Men in their twenties, young men, Negros, dark-skins	Complete fools, "enlightened elites"

Table 2. cont.

Strategy	Us	Them (A)	Them (B)
<p>Politicisation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – nationalisation – party political alignment – rough political alignment – organisationalisation – professionalisation – ascription of being or not being in need of political support 	<p>Poles, Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs</p> <p>Law & Justice (<i>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość</i>), Fidesz</p> <p>centre-right, conservatives, right-libertarians, national-conservatists</p> <p>opposition [in Polish parliament], Visegrad Group, independent think-tanks</p> <p>politician, minister, prime minister (depending on country)</p> <p>–</p>	<p>Syrians, Moroccans, Afghans, Eritreans, Libyans, Somalis</p> <p>–</p> <p>–</p> <p>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</p> <p>–</p> <p>asylum seekers, refugees, “refugees”, (real) war refugees</p>	<p>Germans</p> <p>CDU, Civic Platform (<i>Platforma Obywatelska</i>), SPD</p> <p>leftists, liberals, far-left, socialists, eurocommunists, social democrats, neocommunists</p> <p>government, European Union, European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, freemasonry</p> <p>politician, minister, prime minister, MEP, chairman (depending on country)</p> <p>–</p>
<p>Culturalization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – ethnification – religionisation – primitivisation 	<p>Poles, Europeans, Polish Syrians, Syrian Christians</p> <p>Christians, Catholics</p> <p>–</p>	<p>Arabs, Africans, Syrians, Moroccans, Afghans, Eritreans, Libyans, Somalis</p> <p>Muslims, followers of Islam, Salafites, barbarians, hordes</p>	<p>–</p> <p>atheists</p> <p>–</p>
<p>Social problematisation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – negation – criminalisation – negative ideologisation – victimisation 	<p>–</p> <p>–</p> <p>xenophobic, racist, far-right, right-wing populist</p> <p>persecuted [ones], exterminated [ones], endangered [ones], victims</p>	<p>illegal immigrants, unskilled, unemployed criminals, felons, illegal immigrants, murderers, terrorists, torturers of Christians, bandits, robbers, frauds, smuggler gangs</p> <p>jihadist, Islamic fundamentalists, Islamic extremists, radical Islamists</p> <p>–</p>	<p>helpless</p> <p>far-left, politically correct, ideologues of “multiculturalism”</p> <p>–</p>

COLLECTIVISATION

The strategy of collectivisation refers to social actors as group entities without numbering them (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 53) – the linguistic means specific for this strategy in the analysed texts include deictics featured in the distinction ('Us' and 'Them') and collectives. The second, in case of the 'Us' group, include 'nations' and 'national communities', in which national identity stands as a value that has to be defended against the multiculturalism and cosmopolitan politics of the European Union – "But also stopping the attacking barbarians built our national identity, in which the love of freedom, the desire for independence are not only slogans on banners, but the truest and most important emotions of Poles" (Pawlicki 2015: 18). Also, an unspecified 'society' refers to the societies of the target countries of refugees. On the other hand, there could be two groups of collectives distinguished for the Muslim group ['Them (A)'] – words like 'mass' or 'crowd' are often used to designate the refugees coming to Europe and phrases 'Muslim community' and 'Muslim society' refer to Muslims currently living in Western Europe, as to some kind of lobby, which has influence on local politics and culture:

I am afraid that politicians who are afraid of accusations of racism or xenophobia will not do anything about it. They will prefer to expose us to the danger of Islamic extremists than to risk criticism from the growing Muslim communities. [...] We must realize that France, England, Germany and Sweden are under the influence of the Muslim electorate today (Wybranowski 2015: 32).

SPATIALISATION, DE-SPATIALISATION AND EXPLICIT DISSIMILATION

The spatialisation strategy involves using toponyms as metonymies or personifications of a state/city/continent, etc. (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 48). The toponyms used to represent the category of 'Us' include mostly 'Poland' in reference to Polish society and the names of countries of the Visegrad Group, which objected to European Union's migration crisis policy – 'Hungary', 'Czech Republic' and 'Slovakia', as well as their capitals – 'Budapest', 'Prague' and 'Bratislava', as a metonymy for the governments of the Visegrad Group countries. There is also an analogical metonymy in the case of Saudi Arabia for category 'Them (A)', which refers to the Saudi government contributing money to mosque construction in Europe (Ziemkiewicz 2015a: 19). Moreover, the word 'Syria' was used as a metonymy of arriving refugees and migrants (Sommer 2015: III). The 'Them (B)' category here is assigned to countries which have multicultural societies ('Germany', 'Austria', 'France', 'Sweden'), or countries whose governments exert pressure on the objecting countries, especially 'Germany', which is pictured as the one having hegemonic position in Europe:

Who rules Europe? The current crisis shows this clearly. Berlin rules it and does not try to mask it. The speech of Chancellor Merkel declaring that Germany will accept all refugees from the Middle East who want to settle there, and demanding that other EU countries let them through their territory, was a violation of EU standards (Wildstein 2015: 22–23).

More general phrases are used in reference to the multicultural Western European countries, like ‘the West’ or ‘Western Europe’. Moreover, metonymies are also used in reference to the main decision-making centres of the European Union: ‘Brussels’ and ‘Berlin’. Also, a strategy of de-spatialisation which uses de-toponymic expressions in reference based on local orientation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 48) is present here – the ‘Us’ category is here represented by words designating the native people of the aforementioned Visegrad Group countries – Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians, as well as Europeans in general, which is similar to the ‘Them (B)’ category with ‘Germans’, the neighbouring nation of Poles, which is sometimes pictured as a perpetual geopolitical threat to Poland:

For Germany’s neighbors, the aggressiveness of this country has always been the most disturbing element of their national character, but not the only one. This second feature was the German tendency to utopia. One of its features was the attempt to create a religious state in Prussia – the only such creation in the history of the Middle Ages. Then the radicalism of the Anabaptists and leaders of the peasant wars had some features of utopia, just as the cold consequence in building militarism by Prussia. There is no need to mention the brown utopia of the Third Reich and the Red East (Semka 2015a: 20).

The ‘Them (A)’ category usually manifests itself here by phrases referring to the region of origin of the refugees and Muslim immigrants in Europe (‘Africans’, ‘Middle-Easterners’) as well as the orientalisising term ‘Arabs’. The reference to the local orientation is also present with use of phrases like ‘foreigners’ or ‘outlanders’. This labelling also leads to the strategy of explicit dissimulation, where the xenonym ‘stranger(s)’ is used to describe Muslims/refugees.

ACTIONALIZATION

In case of the strategy of actionalization (and its variation professionalisation), the category of ‘Us’ is represented by the professionyms (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 48) used by experts serving islamophobia, including civil forces that guard the European countries against refugees – ‘political scientists’, ‘sociologists’, ‘analysts’, ‘priests’, ‘famous director’, ‘police’, ‘military’, ‘coastal guards’, ‘border guards’, as well as ‘politicians’, which usually refer to the Visegrad Group politicians objecting to European Union migration policies. All of the designated actors are very often used as an authority to legitimize immigration control, with use of the category of authorization, which assumes that something is true because ‘I say so’ or because ‘so-and-so says so’ (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 104). In addition, numerous random lower-level professions are enumerated to convince the reader that the average European is against accepting the refugees – “Of course, Tusk recently appeared in pictures with “ordinary people” when he visited... the Turkish refugee camp. I do not remember him going to some pub in the suburbs of Brussels. And talking with a Belgian mid-level official, a construction worker or an owner of a car workshop” (Magierowski 2015: 24). By contrast, the ‘Them (B)’ category refers here to opinion-forming circles with professions like ‘politician’, ‘journalist’, ‘columnist’, ‘chairman’ or the general word ‘media’, to ensure the receiver that the matter of welcoming refugees is only an object of interest for symbolic elites:

So, you cannot see the intellectual work of opinion-forming elites or, even more so, the government on the recognition of Polish interests and the formulation of a position. Once again, they implement the scenario of "Negroeness" [„murzyńskość"], counting on the complexes of most Poles towards the West, and [...] they are trying to make the openness to newcomers a measure of our civilization and Europeanism. However, given that uncontrolled immigration directly harms the security and interests of the Pole, it does not seem to bring success to salons (Ziemkiewicz 2015b: 33).

Considering the category 'Them (A)', the range of phrases is semantically wide and often refers to the intentions of people migrating from the Middle-East and North Africa to Europe – from neutral phrases 'newcomers' and 'immigrants', through words indicating the forced character of migration ('asylum seekers', 'refugees', 'fugitives') to expressions signaling the economic purpose of migration, which – depending on the context – have positive, neutral or negative meanings ('economic immigrants') or are clearly negative ('welfare immigrant', 'robber', 'fraud') or – even more – suggest expansion as the purpose of migration ('invader'). Although some authors make clear distinctions between the terms 'refugees' and 'immigrants', both terms are very often used as synonyms, which could blur the difference between them and thus wipe out the aspect of the humanitarian tragedy from the notion of 'refugee'.

SOMATISATION

The strategy of somatisation is not as frequently present in the analysed articles, although there are visible examples of engendering and enaging strategies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 49) – the emphasis is very often put on the quantity of 'young men', 'men in their twenties'. Such a strategy could create an impression that on the one hand the authors try to portray the refugees as being in the demographic band in which most Islamic terrorists could fit, and on the other hand as deserters who have dodged military service in defence of their country and abandoned their families to death (Górny 2015: 20). It is worth mentioning that the racialisation strategy (using words like 'dark-skins' or 'negros') is used very rarely – avoiding such vocabulary might serve to prevent potential accusations of biological racism. The two other groups are usually denoted by expressions referring to mental deficiency in the case of 'Them (B)' ('stupid fools') and rationality ('rational') to refer to 'Us'. One author also uses ironic expressions in quotation marks with common expressions describing the group he considers as 'Us' ('Polish backwater') and 'Them (B)' ('enlightened elites') to undermine the actual meanings of both expressions (Ziemkiewicz 2015a: 18).

POLITICISATION

The strategy of politicisation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 51) is, however, used very often in its various forms. First, nationalisation is clearly visible and could serve multiple purposes. Enumerating nations of refugees ('Syrians', 'Moroccans', 'Afghans', 'Eritreans',

‘Libyans’, ‘Somalis’) creates a clear distinction between Syrians, as the nation fleeing from war in their homeland, and other nations migrating to Europe. The nationym ‘Germans’, situated as a nation in the category ‘Them (B)’, is on the one hand metonymy of the German government and on the other – the actor’s (nation’s) openness for refugees is understood as some kind of act of redemption for the tragedies of World War II (Semka 2015a: 21). Such redemption is, however, received by the authors as insincere. Therefore, other nations (‘Us’ – ‘Poles’, ‘Slovaks’, ‘Hungarians’, ‘Czechs’) should not be forced to participate in the process. Also, the political party alignment serves as an element of a politicisation strategy – the ‘our’ party depends on the profile of the magazine, where in the case most analysed it is ‘PiS’ and in the case of “*Najwyższy Czas!*” it is ‘KORWiN’. The Hungarian ruling party ‘Fidesz’ is listed as ‘Us’, because of its stance against accepting refugees (Górny 2015: 19; Semka 2015b: 12). The ‘Them (B)’ category is designated in all of the titles with ‘Platforma Obywatelska’ – the liberal party, which had been the ruling party in Poland until late October, to underline their responsibility for potential problems that could emerge from accepting refugees – “Indeed, the latest surveys show that most Poles are against accepting immigrants. [...] And yet the Platform after numerous zigzags decided to capitulate to the demands of Brussels. [...] The Platform largely unlearned the conduct of independent foreign policy” (Semka 2015c: 26). Also some expressions referring to people’s rough political orientation are used – in case of the ‘Us’ category the ‘centre’, ‘centre-right’, ‘conservatives’ or in case of “*Najwyższy Czas!*” ‘right-libertarians’ and ‘national-conservatives’ (Mysiek 2015a: LVII) and in case of the ideological opponents – ‘leftists’, ‘liberals’, ‘left-liberals’, ‘far-left’, ‘socialists’, ‘eurocommunists’, ‘socialdemocrats’, and ‘neocommunists’. The organisationalisation strategy in the texts designates ‘Them (B)’ as the decision-making institutions in Poland (‘government’) and ‘European Union’, which also serves as political organisationym (‘European Commission’, ‘European Parliament’, ‘European Council’) with ‘Us’ as the ‘opposition’ (in Polish parliament – the roles reversed after the 2015 parliamentary elections), ‘Visegrad Group’ (as a part of European Union) and ‘independent think-tanks’. In a few texts, especially in “*Najwyższy Czas!*”, the ‘Them (B)’ category also included freemasons (Dobosz 2015 a: XXIV–XXV; Mysiek 2015b: XXIV). The organisation which is assigned to the ‘Them (A)’ category is the ‘Islamic State (of Iraq and Syria)’, which is pictured frequently not only as the aggressor in Syria (where ‘Muslims’ are often not listed as the victims, other than ‘Syrian Christians’), but also as having ties with the refugees arriving in Europe – “the elites clearly do not want to see the connection between Islam and terrorism. The idea of not connecting assassinations with the problem of Islam and immigrants resounds to this day and it seems to be a kind of mental illness” (Dobosz 2015b: XII). In case of the professionalisation as a part of politicisation strategy, the words ‘politician’, ‘prime minister’, ‘Member of European Parliament’, ‘president’ are frequently used, but it depends on the stance on welcoming refugees (which is usually linked with a country of origin) if they are assigned to the ‘Us’ or ‘Them (B)’ category. The ascription of being or not being in need of political support, which refers to the refugees, who are designated as ‘refugees’ or ‘asylum seekers’, when the need is recognized or ‘refugees’, when their motivation to leave their countries is questioned.

CULTURALIZATION

Some of the culturalization strategies seem to be very important in constructing the categories of 'Us' and 'Them (A)/(B)' in the analysed material. In the case of ethnic identity, the most frequently used ethnonyms are 'Poles' and 'Europeans' (of which 'Poles' are a part) as 'Us' and ethnonyms derived from the countries of origin of the refugees as those culturally different. Religion in islamophobic discourse plays a key role, as well as in the analysed texts – within the conservative islamophobia mentioned above. The religionisms representing the 'Us' category are 'Catholics' or more generally 'Christians', as the Christian faith is the core of European culture for the conservative islamophobes – "Well, Europe is not dying because of the huge invasion of immigrants, refugees and ISIS fighters hiding among them, but because its inhabitants have lost the will to live, and earlier the faith which is the main foundation of Western civilization" (Terlikowski 2015a: 38). Very frequent use of words 'Muslims' or 'followers of Islam' (and less often 'Salafites', which refers only to one minor branch of Islam) could be observed in the texts – it might serve to underline religious difference as the key obstacle between 'Us' and 'Them (A)'. A line of distinction is also drawn between 'Us' and 'Them (B)' in terms of religion, where 'Them (B)' are designated as 'atheists' and pictured as responsible for the decay of the traditional, Christian values of Europe – "Muslims living in Europe look at Germans or Belgians and cannot respect them. They see empty churches and full brothels [...] What European values can impress them?" (Tekieli 2015: 39). The combination of religionisation and ethnification strategies makes 'Syrian Christians' the only group of refugees that could be accepted as 'Us' and thus welcome in Poland as 'culturally similar' (Szymowski 2015: XVIII). The category of 'preferred refugee' (Legut and Pędziwiatr 2018: 44) is based on the aspect of cultural similarity and at the same time it expresses a distance from Islam and its believers. A primitivisation strategy, which implies using synecdoche or metonymies denoting 'primitivism' or lack of civilisation, is applied in some texts, where authors call 'Them (A)' 'barbarians', in reference to the fall of the Roman Empire as a metaphor for modern Europe (Terlikowski 2015b: 38; 2015c: 74–75).

SOCIAL PROBLEMATISATION

The last group of referential and predicational strategies found in the analysed material comprises strategies of social problematisation. A wide variety of criminonyms is used to designate 'Them (A)'. Although the criminonyms usually refer to the crimes of Islamic State on their current territory, they often appear in texts about refugees, so the reader may have an impression that the refugees are not running away from these atrocities, but they are going to bring the atrocities to Europe (Wysocki 2015: 16). Such criminonyms include the phrases 'criminals', 'felons', 'murderers', 'terrorists', 'torturers of Christians', 'bandits', 'robbers', and 'frauds'. The criminonyms also could refer to the process of smuggling people – these include 'smuggler gangs' and 'illegal immigrants'. The victimisation strategy is used in some instances, mostly with the use of adjectives like 'persecuted', 'exterminated', 'endangered' and of course the word 'victims' – these refer both to Christians and women in Muslim countries,

as well as – potentially – to the Europeans, who would live side by side with Muslims if their governments accept them (Łysiak 2015: 28). The use of the negation strategy in some cases assumes the use of negative qualonyms (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 52) like ‘unskilled’ or ‘unemployed’ to undermine the usefulness of a refugee to a welcoming society. The liberal political elites [‘Them (B)’] are depicted as ‘helpless’, as the rival media would like to see their incompetence in struggling with the crisis – “the rest of European leaders, with few exceptions, either cannot do anything, or are afraid or stupid” (Karnowski 2015: 3).

Moreover, many examples of a negative ideologisation strategy are applied. In the case of ‘Them (A)’, phrases like ‘jihadists’, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, ‘Islamic extremists’, and ‘radical Islamists’ are used to express the radical ideas that stand behind criminal activity, including terrorism – “the dissemination of real information about Muslims has been recognized as hate speech (about raping women in the name of religion, about the fact that they kill in the name of religion, about the desire to introduce Sharia law)” (Cukiernik 2015: XVIII). The negative ideologisation of political and media elites [‘Them (B)’] usually includes a reference to political activism of some of them in the past (‘far-left’) or to the ‘political correctness’ rejected by right-wing media (‘politically correct’, ‘ideologues of “multiculturalism”’) – “Meanwhile, the leftist discourse on emigration [...] is still based on negating the existence of any problems, dull optimism and blackmailing everyone with political correctness” (Wildstein 2015: 24). It is also interesting, that even the category of ‘Us’ is in some points designated with negative ideologonyms like ‘racist’, ‘xenophobic’, ‘far-right’ or ‘right-wing populist’. Although such views are pictured as wrong, the authors try to justify them with what could be interpreted as a will to gain people with islamophobic views as an electorate for the favoured political party in the forthcoming elections.

CONCLUSIONS

The Polish right-wing press has created a certain picture of events and processes happening due to the most dramatic moments of the 2015 migrant crisis. In this picture, the authors have showed the Polish political right as potential defenders of Europe and its inhabitants. Average Europeans are presented as generally opposed to accepting Middle-Eastern and North African refugees and immigrants and fed up with the multi-cultural model of Western European societies. A racist, xenophobic and right-wing populist rhetoric is often justified as an expression of social anxieties. The main values embraced by both aforementioned groups (which form a group of ‘Us’) are the Christian (especially the Roman-Catholic) religion, a European identity, the nation as the most important form of collectivity, and the idea of a sovereign country. The authorities of the Visegrad countries are pictured as role-models, who guard their sovereignty by rejecting the EU’s policy on migrant relocation. The opponents of accepting refugees and immigrants have been drawn as rational and farsighted – their opinions are often presented as supported by various experts. However, due to the Christian aspect of conservative islamophobia, in many cases authors have allowed accepting Christian refugees as the ‘real victims’ of ongoing humanitarian crises because of the cultural similarities based on the core of European identity – the Christian faith.

On the other hand, refugees of other beliefs have been mostly portrayed as culturally alien and hence unable to assimilate. Many negative consequences have been underlined, including increasing criminal activity, migrant unemployment, and religious radicalization of Muslim communities. A frequent emphasis on the number of refugees and migrants also might have intensified the impression of upcoming problems. The authors have used words and expressions which have served to question the migrants' need for political support, and, therefore, their intentions. In many cases, the people fleeing from endangered regions have been accused of being 'economic immigrants', 'welfare immigrants' or in worse cases religious indoctrinators and Islamic State agents/terrorists.

Still, not only the Muslim refugees and migrants have been labelled as culturally alien to the authors and potential readers of the analysed papers. The European leaders who have voiced their approval for accepting refugees and migrants have been described as disrespectful to crucial European values and willing to merge national countries into integrated, secular European Union ones, where the liberal elites would force the member countries to follow their political agenda. The Civic Platform, the ruling party until late October 2015, has been frequently pictured as being supportive of the ideas of European hegemony, despite its reluctant participation in the EU's refugee relocation program (Legut and Pędziwiatr 2017: 680–682). Also, the liberal opinion-forming elites (including media personas, celebrities, politicians, etc.) have been shown as the only actual supporters of accepting refugees; therefore, the whole idea of humanitarian help throughout 2015 was pictured as a fantasy of a wealthy, cosmopolitan group, completely detached from the reality of the average Pole (or European). Despite an emphasis on the influence of EU leaders on other European governments, the leading Western European countries appeared as actually helpless in dealing with the migration crisis within the texts, as well as with the consequences of existing multi-cultural societies. Therefore, the relocation policy has been shown as a way to transfer responsibility for the crisis onto other countries.

As described, the three aforementioned topics reflect themselves in predicational and referential strategies used in the islamophobic discourse. The authors draw a thick line of distinction between 'Us', the average Europeans, who endorse traditional Christian values and 'Them (A)', denoted as culturally different immigrants, who are not useful for the local economies and welfare systems and, even worse, could commit serious crimes in countries that belong to 'Us'. Moreover, the distinction is also visible between 'Us' and the ideological enemy – 'Them (B)' – the left and liberal political and media elites, targeted on dismantling the Christian identity of Europe, as well as on the deconstruction of traditional nation states. Such employment of conservative islamophobia in media related to Law and Justice could also have led to gaining the islamophobic electorate by the party, which won the 2015 elections.

The research on conservative islamophobia in Poland should not, of course, be limited only to analysing referential and predicational strategies; it should be expanded to investigating other discursive strategies. These include argumentation strategies which justify positive or negative attributions; perspectivization strategies, by which the senders express their position and involvement in discourse; and finally intensifying and mitigation strategies, which qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of discriminatory (in this case islamophobic) utterances (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 45).

The analysis of the employment of such strategies could be also investigated not only in case of press publications, but also other genres like political speeches or election flyers. Such research could, for example, provide answers to the question of the role of islamophobia in the 2015 parliamentary elections in Poland.

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„MY” I „ONI” W JĘZYKU KONSERWATYWNEJ ISLAMOFOBII.
STRATEGIE REFERENCYJNE I PREDYKATYWNE
W POLSKIM PRAWICOWYM DYSKURSIE PRASOWYM
NA TEMAT KRYZYSU MIGRACYJNEGO W 2015 ROKU

Islamofobia (na podstawie książki Vincenta Geissera *Nowa islamofobia*) może być definiowana jako forma kulturowego rasizmu, kładąca nacisk na religię (islam) jako czynnik różniący pomiędzy „nami” i „nimi”,

oraz oparta na fantazmacie islamu i muzułmanów. Zjawisko islamofobii w Polsce nasiliło się radykalnie u szczytu kryzysu migracyjnego w drugiej połowie 2015 roku, wraz z licznymi artykułami i felietonami, które stanowiły podłoże tego typu uprzedzeń. Prasa prawicowa dała przestrzeń autorom wyrażającym dyskryminujące opinie o (głównie muzułmańskich) uchodźcach i imigrantach z Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej. Z użyciem podejścia dyskursywno-historycznego (Wodak and Reisigl), autor dokonał analizy strategii referencyjnych i predykatywnych używanych do nazywania i określania aktorów społecznych, poszukując linii podziału między kategoriami „my” i „oni” w prawicowym dyskursie prasowym na temat kryzysu migracyjnego. Analiza sugeruje, że prawicowi publicyści rozróżniają dwie podkategorie dla kategorii „oni”: (a) uchodźców i imigrantów (zazwyczaj muzułmańskich) oraz (b) liberalne elity polityczne i medialne. Badane teksty mogą być zatem przykładem opisanej szerzej przez Monikę Bobako „konserwatywnej islamofobii”, w ramach której chrześcijańska tożsamość Europy ma stanowić bazę dla uprzedzeń przeciwko muzułmanom i liberalnym zwolennikom multikulturalizmu.

Słowa kluczowe: prasa prawicowa, kryzys migracyjny 2015, islamofobia, Polska